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Abstract 
This paper examines the ethnical crisis ravaging the Niger Delta region of Nigeria with particular emphasis on 
the Western Niger Delta, specifically focusing on Warri. With this examination, the study intends to proffer 
solution on how to remedize future tribal/ethnical crisis with a view to bringing about unity and integration of 
the various ethnic groups in the region. Given the focus of this study, the paper adopts the primordialist, 
instrumentalist and constructivist accounts as the theoretical frameworks in analyzing ethnical crisis in the Niger 
Delta Region. Academic explanations of ethnic conflict generally fall into one of these three schools of thought. 
The paper evaluates the various claims, literatures and assertions made particularly on the original position or 
placement of the headquarters of Warri South local government and repudiates claims that it was initially located 
in Ogbe-Ijoh, an Ijaw community instead of Ogidigben, an Itsekiri village as gazetted by the federal government 
of Nigeria. The study advocates and recommends inter alia, the needs to uphold meritocracy and de-emphasize 
favoritism, nepotism and ethnicity/tribalism as a basis for gaining or obtaining supports, employment, 
promotion, infrastructural development and development attention either from government, individuals or 
groups. The paper thus advocates the need for the introduction of socio-cultural recreational centers, specifically 
created for socio-cultural activities for the Niger Deltans with immense and profound support from government 
with a view to breeding unity and integration amongst the various ethnic groups in the Niger Delta Region. 
Keywords: western niger delta, ethnic, tribes, conflict, crisis, unity and integration. 
 
1. Historical Background 
In the Niger Delta Region, inter and intra ethnic conflicts have been rampant during colonial and post-colonial 
periods. These conflicts have directly or indirectly hampered the unity and peaceful co-existence in the region. 
However, this study takes the Western Niger Delta as its focus which is an important segment of the entire Niger 
Delta. 
Even though the Niger Delta has about forty ethnic groups with the main ones being Urhobo, Ogoni, Ukwuani, 
Isoko and Ijaw, three major ethnic groups have been identified in the Western Niger Delta to be in conflict on 
issues related directly or indirectly to the global conflict situation in the Niger Delta and also the internal 
political contradictions of these three ethnic groups. 
These three groups are the Ijaws whose population of over 7 million makes them the largest in the region, the 
Urhobo and the Itsekiri whose number is only about 450, 000. The conflict between these three groups have been 
particularly intense in the Warri province now Warri city. 1 
One of the most noticeable pieces of evidence of ethnic conflict in Warri province now Warri city, in recent 
times, flows from an action of the government of Western Nigeria, which officially changed the title of the 
Itsekiri King from the Olu of Itsekiri to the Olu of Warri province in May, 1952.2 Apparently, this was before 
independence. This change was made at the request of the Itsekiri over the objection of the Urhobo who felt that 
the title; Olu of Warri province would give the impression that the Olu was a paramount ruler of Warri. The 
province, however, continues to be regarded not only as a home to the Itsekiris but also to the Ijaws and the 
Urhobos. The other indigenous ethnic groups in the area who considered the government decision as an 
imposition on non-Itsekiri people of Warri. The resentment turned into violence when an Itsekiri procession in 
Warri was attacked by some Urhobo elements near the Catholic Cathedral, a location which accidentally was 
also close to the Sacred Agbassah Juju Shrine.3 This singular act led to reactions and counter reactions which 
snowballed to intensive violence in the area. 
The parade may have been seen by the Urhobo as an act of provocation but more importantly as a show of 
authority and power of the Itsekiri in ways that appear to intimidate non-Itsekiri communities in Warri.4 The 
confrontation erupted into a riot that quickly spread all over the city and other places, including Sapele and 
Itsekiri settlements along the River Ethiope, particularly at Ijun, Idjerhe, Eku and Salubi, with considerable loss 
of life and property.5 
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While the Ijaws, Urhobo and Itsekiri have live alongside one another for centuries, for the most part in relative 
harmony, the Itsekiri were the first to make contact with the European traders as early as the 16th century and 
they were more aggressive both in seeking Western education and in using the knowledge acquired to press their 
commercial advantages until 1879. Itsekiri chieftains controlled most of the trade with Europeans in the western 
Niger region. That monopoly was challenged by the Ijaws, yet Europeans continued to find favour with the 
minority Itsekiri. This again bred resentment among the Ijaws at what they felt to be a form of economic 
apartheid perpetrated by Europeans against the Ijaws. The departure of the Europeans (British) during the 
independence of Nigeria in 1960 did not lead to a decrease in tension between the Ijaws and the Itsekiri, instead 
the foundation of conflict had been laid.6 
However, from the foregoing, it is explicit that the Itsekiri has been the canopy of which the conflict of the 
Western Niger Delta region is directly or indirectly directed to. For instance, after the restoration of law and 
order as a result of the aforementioned discord, the issue that triggered and snowballed this discord remains 
unresolved.  
It should be noted however, that 50 years after the 1952 discord, another phase of the crisis sprang up again. This 
led to a series of confrontations following the decision of the Federal Government of Nigeria to relocate the 
headquarters of a Local Government Area from Ogbe-Ijoh, an Ijaw community in Warri to the Itsekiri Village of 
Ogidigben. However, it should be noted that the original placement of the Warri South Local government as 
gazzetted by the Federal Government was Ogidigben an Itsekiri Village not Ogbe-Ijoh as asserted by some 
literatures. Disturbance is reported in many places, most noticeable in Sapele, Koko and Benin River, but the 
tempest was unleashed with the burning down of the Warri residence of Chief E. K. Clark in the early hours of 
March 25, 1997, allegedly by some Itsekiri youths.7 The reaction from the Ijaw was swift and it did not take long 
before Warri City of the Western region in the Niger Delta was plunged into one of the most vicious and 
destructive armed conflicts known in the area, which was to linger on for over 2 years. Even in the absence of 
reliable figures, hundreds of lives were believed to be lost and damage to properties belonging to members of 
both opposing ethnic groups was extensive. In spite of their supposed non-involvement, the Urhobo community 
was not spared the atrocities generated from these rounds of clashes. The Urhobo community of Okere in Warri 
was reported invaded on June 4, 1999, early in the day, by the Itsekiri youths, again with loss of lives and 
massive destruction of properties, including the palace of the Ovie of Okere-Warri, whose appointment the 
Itsekiri Opposed.8 
With the discovery of large petroleum resources in the Niger Delta region in the late 1950s, a new bone of 
contention was introduced as the ability to claim ownership now promised to yield immense benefits in terms of 
jobs and infrastructural development expected to be provided by the oil companies. Tied to this economic 
expectation was the question of local political ownership within the Niger Delta region. The Ijaws feel that the 
allocation of power in the region does not reflect their superior numbers. This is especially seen in the largest 
metropolitan area of Warri which has become the prime source of political patronage and the hot spot of political 
contest.9 
It should be noted however, as well as truism, that competition for wealth has fuelled violence between these two 
ethnic groups leading to the ethnic militarization of nearly the entire region. We can accurately assert that the 
three indigenous communities of Itsekiri, Ijaw and Urhobo have lived independently of one another in relative 
peace before the arrival of the Europeans in the coastal area. The British who eventually gained control of the 
area, ushered in an administration that brought together these people who are culturally different into the same 
political unit, purely for commercial ends, without regards for lack of cultural affinity and common will among 
those involved.10 “Such a society” according to Horowitz, “held together by the dint of the force of colonial 
power is inherently a precarious and unstable social form”.11 
It is also pivotal to note that the issue of Local Government Ward allocation has proven particularly contentious. 
Control of the city of Warri, the largest metropolitan area in Delta State and therefore a prime source of political 
patronage, has been an especially fiercely contested area. This has given birth to heated and unbridled disputes 
between the Ijaw, the Itsekiri and the Urhobo about which of the three groups are “truly” indigenous to the Warri 
region, with underlying presumption being that the “real” indigenes should have control of the leavers of power, 
regardless of the fact that all three groups enjoy ostensibly equal political rights in their place of residence.12 
However, the crisis in Warri, arose each time, from the struggle to dominate local politics. The conflict is 
centered on the use and distribution of community land in Warri, which for the most part can be attributed to the 
failure of British colonial policies. The Colonial arrangement created an obvious abnormality which unfairly 
gave an Itsekiri chieftain, Dore Numa, the authority as a political agent, to lease land. The leases of land were 
contracted without the consent of the communities concerned and clearly a violation of treaties signed earlier 
between the British colonial government and the communities that owned the land dispute. The question of who 
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owns the land and who is entitled to rents accruing from them has become problematic. Land disputes, however 
are not unique to Warri but have become a major factor in political conflict in many areas of Nigeria including 
Kafanchan in Benue State, Ife-Modakeke in Oyo State, and Umuleri-Aguleri in Anambra State and around the 
world in such places as the region of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; of course, ethnic conflict are 
recurrent phenomenon in human history. Much of Eastern Europe and certainly the Bulkans have experienced 
waves of disturbances based on ethnicity before and after the emergence of modern States.13 A recent study 
indicated that between 1945 and 1980, State-Sponsored killing of members of various ethnic and political groups 
were responsible for a greater loss of lives than all other forms of deadly conflicts combined.14 
Taking into cognizance all these analyses as regards the crisis in the Western Niger Delta Region particularly in 
Warri, we would be quick to argue that the root  of the Warri crisis is the Kaiama Declaration of the Ijaw youths 
which was essentially a declaration that the entire Niger Delta Region of Nigeria to some extent Belonged to 
them. This of course is not a truism as it is a common knowledge that several other ancient ethnic groups like the 
Ibibios, the Itsekiri, the Andonis, the Urhobos, the Efiks, etc. alongside the Ijaws inhabit the area. The Warri 
crisis was the beginning of the implementation of the Kaiama declaration by the Ijaw youths. The Itsekiris, a tiny 
minority occupying lands containing some 20% to 40% of the total oil wealth of Nigeria, were a prime target of 
the Ijaws and they were to be quick and gain as the Ijaws envisaged that they could easily be run over, 
considering their status as a minority of minorities and the fact that they, unlike the Ijaws were unprepared for 
war. Simultaneously, in the hope of making quick work of the Itsekiri, Ijaws took their expansionist agenda also 
to Edo State as well as to Ondo State where they were brutally halted by the majority ethnic groups in those 
States as claimed by some scholars. The trigger or opportunity for the commencement of the implementation of 
the Kiama Declaration and thus of the so called Warri crisis was when the then Military administrator of Delta 
State, Colonel David Dungs, was seen to have unilaterally announced in a broadcast to the state that the 
Headquarters of the newly created Warri South-West Local Government Area was Ogbe-Ijoh, an Ijaw 
settlement, contrary to Ogidigben, an Itsekiri town, as was dully gazzetted by the Federal Government of 
Nigeria. The Colonel Dungs maneuver is believed to have been sponsored by the Ijaws, he being not from the 
area but from far away Plateau State in North Central Nigeria and therefore aught not to have had any vested 
interest in the matter and considering that the action was solely to the benefit of the Ijaws. That the Itsekiris put 
up no resistance initially buttresses this point. That the ijaws commenced a war rather than a protest and even 
went on to “capture” and retain known traditional Itsekiri territories like Kantu and Okenrengigho (which they 
said to have re-christened “Okenrenkoko” contrary to what is on every map of the Area) also buttressed this 
point. The so-called Warri crisis therefore was not a crisis but a war of attrition waged by the Ijaws against their 
Itsekiri brothers with whom they had co-existed peacefully before advent of Ijaw nationalism.15 
However, with these various ethnic crises ravaging the peaceful co-existence of the Western Niger Delta, 
particularly in Warri which the paper identified as hot spot, the paper therefore tends to provide academic 
strategies for combating these ethnic crises that would eventually restore lasting peace and unity among the 
ethnic groups in the Niger Delta.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Given the primary focus of this study, three schools of thought have been adopted; Primordialist, Instrumentalist 
and Constructivist. More recent scholarship draws on all three schools in order to increase our understanding of 
ethnic conflict. All three schools of thought will be taken in turn for explanation: 
2.1 Primordialist 
Proponents of primordialist accounts of ethnic conflict argue that “(e) ethnic groups and nationalities exist 
because there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and 
especially territorial location”.16 Donald L. Horowitz argues that this kinship “makes it possible for ethnic groups 
to think in terms of family resemblances”.17 
Primordialism builds on anthropological theories with emphasis that members of the same ethnic groups have a 
common cultural/ancestral bond that determines their ethnic identity and community mode of livelihood 
different from the ‘other’ History books are replete with fact that Ijaws are the most ancient and indigenous 
inhabitants of wherever they are found in the riverine areas in Benin, Warri and Ugbo. In fact, it is the verdict of 
history that the Ijaws are the most ancient people in the whole Nigeria, and are among the most ancient West 
Africa.18 This argument has brought a lot of controversies as the Itsekiri was fast to react and also laid claim for 
ancestral territory. According to P. A. Talbot, once acting Resident of Benin Division (1920), calls the Ijaws 
“this strange people – a survival from the dim past beyond the dawn of history-whose language and customs are 
distinct from those of their neighbors and without trace of any tradition of time before they were driven-
southwards into these regions of Sombre Mangroves. In another context, Dr. Talbot submits firmly; “their 
(Ijaws) origin is wrapped in mystery. The people inhabit practically the whole coast, some 250 miles in length, 
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stretching between the Ibibio and Yoruba. The Niger Delta is therefore, occupied by the strange people. This 
assertion by Talbot was jettisoned by the Itsekiri when they claimed that the Itsekiri kingdom extends to Ijaw 
and Urhobo communities in Warri with some laying claims that the whole of Niger Delta is the Ancestral land of 
Itsekiri’’.19 
However, facts had it that the Ijaws attempted to claim part of Lagos. Furthermore, an analysis of the traditions 
of some of the Ijoh groups in the Western Niger Delta fringe suggest that the Egbema had visited the vicinity of 
Lagos Ukuroma or Iko (Eku, Lagos) in early times. The traditions of Olodiama Ijo agree with those of Benin that 
Oba Orhogbua (1550-1578) on his return journey from Lagos attacked the Ilaje people of main (Okiti-Pupa) and 
executed its ruler as a traitor. And that after Oba Orhogbua defeated the Ilaje, he stopped at Ikoro, a major town 
of the Olodiama Ijo on his return from Lagos to Benin. It is worth to note that this claims by the Ijaws and other 
discords resulted in the violence and mayhem between the Egbesu of the Ijaws and the Odua Peoples Congress 
(OPC) of the Yoruba in Lagos in October 1999. 
There are a number of political scientists who refer to the concept of ethnic wars as a Myth because they argue 
that the root causes of ethnic conflict do not involve ethnicity but rather institutional, political, and economic 
factors.  
2.2 Instrumentalist  
Anthony Smith notes that instrumentalist account “came to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s in the United 
State, in the debate about (white) ethnic persistence  
in what was supposed to have been an effective melting pot”.20 This new theory sought to explain such 
persistence as the result of the actions of community leaders, “who used their cultural groups as sites of mass 
mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources, because they found them more 
effective than social classes”.21   
Instrumentalist, do not think of psychological bonding. They perceive ethnic as one of the many means or 
resources available to elites to be used to achieve political or economic goals. In this account of ethnic 
identification, “ethnicity and race are viewed as instrumental identities, organized as means to particular ends.22 
The primordialist and instrumentalist approaches however are not mutually exclusive. As Solomon Gashaw put 
it: The primordialist emphasis on ethnicity as a quasi-ontological object does not preclude it from being used as a 
manipulative instrument by the elites (Gashaw, 1993).23 
Whether ethnicity is fixed perception is not crucial in the instrumentalist accounts. Moreover, the scholars of this 
school do generally not oppose neither that ethnic difference is a part of many conflicts nor that a lot of 
belligerent human beings believe that they are figuring over such difference. Instrumentalists simply claim that 
ethnic difference is not sufficient to explain conflict.24, 25 
With reference to the Ijaw and Itsekiri conflict, incessant political interference has quite often escalated what 
would have been normal tensions. According to a Press Release by the Urhobo national Forum in America in 
1999,26 the Ijaw – Itsekiri conflict arose from a close friendship between the King of Itsekiri (Olu of Warri) and 
the late Military President of Nigeria, Gen. Sani Abacha. This is a good example of the manipulative instrument 
by the elites as Gashaw analyzed.  
 
2.3 Constructivism 
The popularization of the theory of constructivism is generally attributed to Jean Piaget, who articulated 
mechanism by which knowledge is internalized by learners. He suggested that through processes of 
accommodation and assimilation individuals construct new knowledge from their experiences. When individual 
assimilate, they incorporate the new experience into already existing framework without changing the 
framework.  
It should be noted however, that constructivism is not a particular pedagogy. In fact, constructivism is a theory 
describing how learning happens. It would be a constructive account when we have an historical retrospection of 
the conflict in the Western Niger Delta i.e, Warri, from Colonial and Post-colonial periods. The theory of 
constructivism suggests that learners construct knowledge out of their experiences. The paper therefore posits 
that this age long crisis in the Western region has become empirical knowledge developed by Western Niger 
Deltans through experiences. However, constructivism is often associated with pedagogic approach that 
promotes active learning. 
Constructivists, according to George Ngwane, hold the opinion that the Itsekiri and Ijaw crises are based not on 
the real or perceived differences between the two tribes but rather on distributive sectional struggles for the 
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largesse of the oil industry including infrastructural and financial compensations provided by the oil 
multinationals. He concluded that as soon as all groups needs are taken care of through good-enough 
Governance, all ethnic differences and hence ethnic clashes become minimized.27 
More recently, scholars of ethnic conflict and civil wars have introduced theories that draw insight from an all 
three traditional schools of thought. In the Geography of Ethnic Violence, for example, Monica Duffy Toft 
shows how ethnic group settlement patterns, socially constructed identities, charismatic leaders, issue 
indivisibility, and state concern with precedent settings can lead rational actors to escalate a dispute to violence, 
even while doing so is likely to leave contending groups much worse off.28 
These theories of conflict help us in providing the foundation for a proper study of tribal/ethnic conflicts 
ravaging the Western Niger Delta and advocates the need for unity and integration which this paper is anchored 
on. The other segment of this paper intends to rigorously look at The Niger Delta area and the concept of ethnic 
and tribal groups. 
 
3. The Niger Delta 
 
Nigeria Delta, the delta of the Niger River in Nigeria, is a very densely populated region sometimes called the 
Oil River because it was once a major producer of palm oil. The area was the British Oil River Protectorate from 
1885 until 1893, when it was expanded and became the Niger Coastal Protectorate.29 
The Niger Delta, as now defined officially by the Nigerian government, extends over about 70, 000km2 and 
make up 7.5% of Nigeria’s land mass. Historically and cartographically, it consists of present day Bayelsa, 
Delta, and Rivers States. In 2000, however, Obasanjo’s regime included Abia, Edo, Imo and Ondo States in the 
region. Some 31 million people30 of more than 40 ethnic gropups including the Bini, Efik, Ibibio, Annang, Oron, 
Ijaw, Itsekiri, Isoko, Urhobo, Ukwuani, and Ogoni, are among the inhabitants in the Niger Delta, Speaking about 
250 different dialects. 
The Niger Delta and the “South South Zone”, which includes Akwa Ibom State, Bayelsa State, Cross River 
State, Delta State, Edo State and Rivers State, are two different entities. While the Niger Delta is the Oil 
producing region, the South-South Zone is a geographical zone.31 
The delta is an oil rich region and has been the centre of international controversy over devastating pollution and 
ecocide, kleptocracy (notably in the Abacha’s regime) and human rights violations in which Royal Dutch Shell 
has been implicated.32 It is pivotal to note in concrete terms/phases historically that during the colonial period, 
the core Niger Delta was a part of the eastern region of Nigeria, which came into being in 1951 (one of the three 
region, and later one of the four region). This region included the people of Colonial Calabar and Ogoja 
divisions, which are the present Ogoja, Annang, Ibibio, Oron, the Efik people and the Ibo people as the majority 
and the NCNC (National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon) is the ruling political party in the region. NCNC 
later became National Convention of Nigerian Citizens, after Western Cameroon decided to separate from 
Nigeria. The ruling party of Eastern Nigeria did not seek to preclude the separation and even encouraged it. 
In 1953, the old Eastern region had a major crisis due to the expulsion of Professor Eyo Ita from office by the 
majority Igbo tribe of the old Eastern region. Eyo Ita from Calabar was one of the pioneer nationalist for 
Nigerian independence. He was an Efik  man. The Ibibio, Annang, Efik, Ijaw and Ogoja, demanded a state of 
their own, the Calabar – Ogoja River (COR) state. The struggle continued and was a major issue on the status of 
minorities in Nigeria during debates in Europe for Nigerian Independence. 
In 1961, another Major crisis occurred in then Eastern region of Nigeria, when the leadership of the region 
allowed the present South Western Cameroon to separate from Nigeria (Akwa Ibom and Cross River) through a 
plebiscite while the leadership of the then Northern Region did what they had to do to keep North Western 
Cameroon in Nigeria that is the present day Adamawa and Taraba States. Without the 1961 plebiscite, Nigeria 
would not have the current problem with Cameroon about Bakasi as Bakasi would have been an interior part of 
Nigeria (Akwa Ibom and Cross River) territory. 
A second phase of the agitation saw the declaration of an independent Niger Delta Republic by Isaac Adaka 
Boro during Ironsi’s administration, just before the Nigerian Civil War. 
During the Nigerian Civil war, South Eastern States of Nigeria was created (also known as South Eastern 
Nigeria or Coastal South Eastern Nigeria), which had the colonial Calabar division, and colonial Ogoja division. 
River State was also created. South Eastern State and River State became two States for the Minorities of the old 
eastern region, and the Majority Igbo of the Old Eastern region had a state called East Central State. South 
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Eastern State was renamed Cross River State and was later split into Cross River State and Akwa Ibom State. 
River State was later divided into River State and Bayelsa State. 
The third phase saw the request for justice and the end of marginalization of the area by the Nigerian 
Government with Ken Saro Wiwa as the lead figure for this phase of the struggle. The indigents cried for lack of 
development even though the Nigerian oil money is from the area. They also complained about environmental 
pollution and destruction of the land and rivers by oil companies. Ken Saro Wiwa and other leaders were killed 
by the Nigerian Federal Government under Sani Abacha. 
Unfortunately, the agitation for a good Niger Delta got out of control, and the present phase, the phase four, 
became militant. The deprived and exploited Niger Detans went violently unbridled. This phase saw the 
kidnapping of expatriates and vandalization of oil pipe lines. As a result of the degree of this violent – struggle 
and the taking up arms against the State, there became a need for the government to introduce the amnesty 
programmes as a way of shielding their swords. This led to the fifth phase which is the present Niger Delta. 32a 
However, for a proper historical anchor of the Niger Delta, a retrospective of the various segment of the old 
Niger Delta should be analyzed.  
3.1 Western (Or Northern) Niger Delta 
Western Niger Delta consists of the Western section of the Coastal South South Nigeria which includes Delta, 
and the Southern part of Edo and Ondo States. The Western (or Northern) Niger Delta is an heterogeneous 
society with several ethnic groups including the Urhobo, Delta Ibo, Isoko, Itsekiri, Ijaw (or Ezon) and Ukwuani 
groups in Delta State, along with Yoruba (Ilaje) in Ondo State. The livelihoods are primarily based on fishing 
and farming. History has it that the Western Niger was controlled by Chiefs of the five primary ethnic groups the 
Itsekiri, Isoko, Ukwuani, Ijaw and Urhobo with whom the British government had to sign separate “Treaties of 
Protectorates” that later became Southern Nigeria. 
3.2 Central Niger Delta 
Central Niger delta consists of the coastal South South Nigeria which includes Beyelsa and Rivers State. The 
Central Niger Delta region has the Ijaw (Opobo, Bonny etc.), Okrika, and Andoni Kalabairi  etc clans, the Ogoni 
and other groups which consist of the Ekpeye, Ndoni, Etche, Ikwere and Ndoki in Rivers State. 
3.3 Eastern Niger Delta 
Eastern Niger Delta Section consists of the Eastern (or Atlantic) section of the coastal South South. South 
Nigeria which include Akwa Ibom and Cross River States. The Eastern Niger Delta Region has the Efik, Ibibio, 
Annang, Oron, Ogoja (including Ekoi and Bekwara) people, who are all related with a common language and 
ancestors. 
Nigeria has more than 250 ethnic groups, with varying languages and customs, creating a country of rich ethnic 
diversity. The largest ethnic groups are the Fulani/Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo accounting for 62% of population, while 
the Edo, Ijaw, Itsekiri, Jukun, Urhobo, Igala, Idoma and Tiv comprise 33%, other Minorities make up the 
remaining five percentage (5%). The middle belt of Nigeria is known for its diversity of ethnic groups, including 
the Pijem, Goemal, and Kofjar. 
The number of languages currently estimated and catalogued in Nigeria is 521. This number includes 510 living 
languages, two second languages without native speakers and nine extinct languages. In some areas of Nigeria, 
ethnic groups speak more than one language. The official language of Nigeria, English, was chosen to facilitated 
the cultural and linguistic unity of the country. 
However, one of   the primary focuses of this paper is to examine the concept “Tribe/Ethnic” in the Niger Delta 
region with a view to mapping out strategy to create unity amongst these tribes/ethnic groups with a view to 
ensuring peaceful co-existence and rapid development in the region. 
The social structure of a tribe can vary greatly from case to case, but, due to the small size of tribes, it is always a 
relatively simple role structure, with few (if any) significant social distinction between individuals. With this 
analysis, an explicit conceptual clarification of the concepts “tribes” or and “ethnicity” should be viewed. 
 
4. Tribe/ Ethnicity 
Tribe is viewed, historically or developmentally, as a socio-cultural groups exiting before the development of, or 
outside of, States. Many anthropologists use the term tribal society to refer to societies organized largely on the 
basis of kinship, especially corporate descents groups (see clan and kinship).33 
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Some theorists hold that tribe represents a stage in social evolution intermediate between bands and states. Other 
theorist argues that tribes developed after, and must be understood in terms of their relationship to states.34 
‘Tribe’ is a contested term due to its roots in colonial anthropological foundation and the connotations that these 
hierarchical definitions have. To avoid these implications, some have chosen to use the terms ‘ethnic group’ or 
‘nation’ instead.35, 36, 37 
It should be mentioned however, that care is needed to avoid the use of the term “tribe” to describe into to, ethnic 
groups. ‘Tribe’ according to Ukpo is largely a racist term. The Ibo and Hausa, Fulani, of Niger Delta are each 
made up of 5 to 10 million people, a figure comparable to the number of Say or Croats. Yet we do not refer to 
the latter groups as “tribe”.38 The term “tribe” is almost exclusively, and very indifferently, applied to people of 
Native American of African origin. It is a label which emerges with imperialism in its application to those who 
were non-Europeans and lived in a colonial or semi colonial dependency. In Asia, Africa and Latin America.39 
As we are attempting to discard the prejudice of imperialism it is in our best interest to discard the use of the 
term “tribe” when referring to the ethnic group of Nigeria.40 
Nigeria, Africa’s most populated country is composed of more than 250 ethnic groups; the following are the 
most populous and particularly influential. Hausa and Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo 18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 
4%, Ibibio 3.5%, Tiv 2.5%.41 
From the above it comes clear that the Ijaw in the Niger Delta has the highest population when compared with 
other ethnic groups in the Niger Delta region as this study is pre-occupied and concerned with ethnical related 
issues in the region. 
However, the study intends to take a glance at the Western Niger Delta. The Western Niger Delta has five ethnic 
groups; Ijaw, Isoko, Itsekiri, UKwuani and Urhobo. The map below illustrates the position of these ethnic groups 
but does not display Isoko, which lies to the Southeast of Ijaw. It also does not display Ukwani, which lies to the 
North and Northeast of Urhobo.  
Figure 1. Map Depicting Ethnic Groups In Western Niger Delta, 
Borrowed and adapted from O.Edevbie by the authors  
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Table 1: Tribes / Ethnic Groups in the Niger Delta Region 
Source: The Study 
The table above shows the various tribes/ethnic groups in the Niger Delta. In the table, it is explicit that the 
Cross River has the highest number of tribes/ethnic groups 
 
5. The Need For Unity and Intergration Amongst Niger Delta Tribes/Ethnic Groups 
With the avalanche of tribal/ethnic crises that have ravaged the peaceful co-existence of Niger Delta Unity, the 
study therefore shows and reveals steps that are supposed to be followed to achieve the mushroomed unity and 
integration among the ethnic groups in the Niger Delta region. 
Before the advent of colonialism, the different ethnic tribes had their traditional system of government that 
helped them lived peacefully. Thus, the various tribes that existed before colonialism began were able to live in 
harmony because their lands were not seized from them. So, there was no acrimony as we have today where the 
government seized lands from the people and steal their wealth. The Niger Delta people are being oppressed 
under The Land Use Decree No.6 1978 which put all lands in Nigeria under the control of the government and 
made them became tenants in their ancestral land. For the oil-bearing communities in the Niger Delta however, 
oil has been more of a curse than a blessing. “In communities where oil exploitation and production are carried 
out onshore, deforestation, erosion and destroyed farm lands are the main signposts for this gift of nature” 
(Udeme, 2004 42 Okolo,2008) 43 
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Unity cannot be imposed on the people of Niger Delta when the ingredients of unity are lacking. The study 
therefore suggests the following: 
1. That there is the need to uphold meritocracy and de-emphasize favouritism, nepotism and 
ethnicity/tribalism as a basis for gaining and obtaining supports, employment, promotion, infrastructural 
development and development attention either from government, individuals or groups. This will go a 
long way in breeding ethnic integration as people in the Niger Delta region would be employed and 
supported on the basis of meritocracy and not on tribal or ethnic affiliation. 
2. The paper posits the need for the introduction, establishment or formulation of socio-cultural 
recreational centres specifically created for socio-cultural activities such as sport, cultural activities, etc 
for the Niger Deltans with immense and profound support from government with a view to breeding 
Unity and integration amongst the various ethnic groups in the Niger Delta region. 
3. It therefore calls for equity in terms of sighting of developmental projects in the region. For instance,if a 
College of Education is being built in any of the ethnic groups in the region, lets say, the Urhobo area, 
such College of Education is also expected to be built in all other ethnic groups in the region 
irrespective of size and population of such ethnic group as this will make every ethnic group in the 
region to see themselves as equal and no one is as much important than the other. This will 
unprecedentedly breed unity and integration amongst these ethnic groups in the region as the spirit of 
nepotism and favouritism in terms of sighting development projects that have been responsible for the 
various ethnic conflicts during colonial and post colonial areas would be witted down significantly. 
4. Niger  Deltans can effectively fight for their course if they realize the need to be bound together, share 
common ties, the belief that they can live happily together, not satisfied when disunited and can not 
tolerate subjections to people who do not share this ties. Through this, they can effectively agitate for 
resource control, the principle of derivation and even the issue of Onshore- Offshore Dichotomy.  
5. The study advocates for the need for a more integrated and articulated programmes of ethnic conflict 
prevention. Such programmes should be to effectively remedy and prevent ethno-tribal conflict as the 
case may be. Here, the youth should be carried along. Emphasis should be on Early Warning Signals 
(EWS) with a view to monitoring and detecting any tribal/ethnical differences among the Niger Deltans 
before it snowballs and degenerates into an unbridled tribal/ethnical crisis. 
6. Sentiments must be stopped:  Sentiments are one of the major problems that are threatening the cause 
for unity and harmony in the Niger Delta. The war of words and tribal feuds are being squabbled by 
Nigerian all over the country. We must stop making sweeping generalization on other tribes, and 
reserve our emotions towards other tribes in the Niger Delta for peace to reign in the region. 
7. Sense of Brotherhood: This is very pivotal not only in maintaining peace and unity in the Niger Delta 
but also in upholding peace and tranquillity among Niger Deltans. Niger Deltans should regard all and 
sundry as one. Parents at home and teachers in school should orient the kids about the significant of 
unity. The Niger Deltans should believe that they belong to one family. The notion of `We` vs `Them` 
should be abrogated and expunged from the minds of Niger Deltans with a view to being stronger, safer 
and more United. In other words, the Ijaws and the Itsekiris in addendum, with the Urhobos and other 
Niger Delta ethnic groups should see themselves as one blood and as such, no need for disintegration. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Ethnocentrism, tribalism, persecution and prebendalism have played a visible role in Niger Delta politics both 
prior and subsequent to independence in 1960. In the larger picture, kin-selective altruism has made its way into 
Nigerian politics, spurned (spurred?) various attempts by tribalists to concentrate federal power to a particular 
region of their interests.43 Ethnic violence over the oil producing Niger Delta region and inadequate 
infrastructures are some of the current issues bedeviling the region. 
It would be foolhardy for the Nigerian government to address the ethnic conflict ravaging the Niger Delta, 
particularly in the Western Niger Delta, paramount among them are the Ijaw, Itsekiri and the Urhobo as 
separated from the greater collective identities that make Nigeria and that has been referred to as the National 
question. With the picture of Nigeria as a whole that encompasses Niger Delta which is a unit/segment, it is 
believed that the regionalization of Nigeria into North, East and West without South leading to three major 
ethnic languages, three major political parties and the distribution of resources in an unbalanced manner have 
been one of the banes of the surge in ethnic violence.  
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One of the fundamental challenges would be a thorough ethnic conflict transformation exercise that has inbuilt 
conflict preventive mechanism either in governance relation or in constitutional engineering. Yet they would be 
like in most resource blessed countries, a case for grievance against greed in the Niger Delta and even changing 
ethnic belligerent even when the root causes of conflicts may have been examined and addressed.44 
The intensity of the conflict on the surface is hard to explicate to writers like Lloyd and others in the Western 
World who consider ethnic riots as urban issues that involve working class people. Lloyd in his attempt to 
explain the ethnic politics in Warri posed the question: What had the Itsekiri common man to gain from these 
struggles? The conflict does not appear to have much to do with economic competition between the groups. 
Warri has not been known for any labour unrest that arose from factory closings or evidences of businesses that 
are specifically limited to any one group. Lloyd may have sensed the real reason for the ethnic problem, when he 
remarked that “….one ought to look closely to see which individuals gain from exploiting this tension and study 
the means by which they seek to gain their ends”.45 
Warri has become heterogeneous and polyglot. The reality of urbanization, means that the Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhobo, 
and in fact, all groups of people in Western Niger Delta regardless of race, ethnicity or religious background 
must learn to live together in peace and harmony, sharing common goals and working for a common destiny. 
The medieval doctrine of feudal over lordship of Warri, imposed by the British, has long been deposed in 
Nigerian Courts. Besides the lack of legal basis, using the notion of over-lordship to establish privileges for some 
while denying them same to some other indigenes of the same area, is archaic and has no place in a modern 
society. Many members of the three ethnic groups, in spite of cultural differences and obstacles created by their 
leaders, much to their credits continues to intermingle through marriage and business interactions, making the 
need for peaceful co-existence all the more imperative.46 
The paper therefore calls for unity and integration amongst the indigenous communities with a view to 
improving on this trend by coming together through credible leaders to fashion a course of action to halt the theft 
of oil wealth and to wrest the control of the resources of the area from the Federal Government. This integration 
among these ethnic groups can lead to a unified and consolidated Niger Delta ideas, opinion, belief and political 
aspirations that will be so concrete and difficult to be disintegrated and disunited. 
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